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涉疆议题是美国以疆制华、经略欧亚的重要战略工具，在涉疆议题的框架下关联中亚，是美国抗衡“一带一路”倡议的重要手段。深入分析美国主流智库对涉疆及中亚议题的关注重点，能为维护中国国际形象、推进高质量共建“一带一路”提供参考。本文基于《全球智库报告2020》中的11所美国主流智库为研究对象，综合采用内容分析法和文献分析法对2013年9月至2025年10月的28份文献进行分析。研究表明，美国主流智库对涉疆及中亚议题的关注重点主要分布于经济、政治、安全、价值观等维度；它们关注此类议题的动因主要是迎合美国政府需要、维护智库自身利益、认为“一带一路”成果“挑战了美国霸权秩序”、重视中亚独特的战略地位等；美国主流智库对相关议题的关注对美国政府、中美关系、中国与中亚关系、国际舆论产生了重要影响。可通过建设我国特色国际化智库、构建更紧密的中国—中亚命运共同体、全方位提升“中国话语”的国际传播效能等措施进行应对。
Abstract：Xinjiang-related issues are one of the strategic chess games of the United States in the Eurasian continent. Connecting with Central Asia and driving a wedge between China and Central Asia under the framework of Xinjiangrelated issues is an important means for the United States to curb the implementation of the Belt and Road Initiative. Analyzing the focus of mainstream US think tanks on issues related to Xinjiang and Central Asia can provide references for maintaining China's international image and promoting high-quality BRI cooperation. Based on the 2020 Global Go To Think Tank Index Report, 11 mainstream US think tanks were selected as the sample for this study. A total of 28 documents published from September 2013 to October 2025 were then analyzed using content analysis and literature review. The research reveals that mainstream US think tanks focus on issues related to Xinjiang and Central Asia across economic, political, security, and value dimensions. Their attention to these issues is primarily driven by the actual needs of the US government, combined with their own interests. Furthermore, the achievements of the Belt and Road Initiative are perceived as challenging the US hegemonic order, while Central Asia's unique strategic position adds to its geopolitical salience. Attention to these issues is likely to significantly influence the US government, Sino-US relations, China-Central Asia ties, and international public opinion. In response, China can take measures such as building world-class think tanks, continuing to foster a closer China-Central Asia community of shared future, and improving the effectiveness of its international communication.
(1)新华社：《习近平：新疆不再是边远地带，而是一个枢纽地带》，2022年7月16日，https：//news.youth.cn/sz/202207/t20220716_13849642.htm,2025年10月14日。
(2)参见王飞、杜松平：《美国在中亚涉疆反华的媒体操控及我国对中亚传播的策略探索》，《新疆大学学报》（哲学社会科学版）2022年第5期，第48页。
(3)中华人民共和国外交部：《习近平出席第二届中国—中亚峰会并作主旨发言》，2025年6月17日，https：//www.mfa.gov.cn/web/gjhdq_676201/gj_676203/yz_676205/1206_676908/xgxw_676914/202506/t20250617_11651949.shtml,2025年10月14日。
(4)郭永良：《共建“一带一路”背景下对美国炒作涉疆问题的应对》，《中国人民公安大学学报》（社会科学版）2020年第2期，第2页。
(1)参见王飞、哈热哈西·叶克芬：《美国在中亚对“涉疆议题”的“驯化”研究》，《新疆师范大学学报》（哲学社会科学版）2021年第6期，第75—80页。
(2)(3)See James G. McGann，“2020 Global Go To Think Tank Index Report，”Bruegel,January 28,2021, https：//www.bruegel.org/sites/default/files/wp-content/uploads/2021/03/2020-Global-Go-To-Think-Tank-Index-Report-Bruegel.pdf,July 8,2025.
(1)See“Philippe Le Corre|Carnegie Endowment for International Peace，”Carnegie Endowment,August 18,2022,https：//carnegieendowment.org/people/philippe-le-corre?lang=en,October 11,2025.
(2)See Hal Brands，“Managing Strategic Competition Research Group，”Georgetown University,October 5,2023,https：//uschinadialogue.georgetown.edu/cn/people/hal-brands,October 11,2025.
(3)参见甄飞扬：《美国智库对中国参与太平洋岛国事务的负面认知：成因与对策》，《情报杂志》2023年第7期，第40页。
(4)李自良、曹志恒、刘兵等：《瞭望·治国理政纪事|打造我国向西开放桥头堡》，2024年9月28日，https：//www.news.cn/politics/20240928/a4c027c1560b4ae88e38a0e061385498/c.html,2025年10月11日。
(1)Temur Umarov，“China Looms Large in Central Asia，”Carnegie Endowment for International Peace,March 30,2020,https：//carnegieendowment.org/posts/2020/03/china-looms-large-in-central-asia?lang=en,July 6,2023.
(2)Hal Brands，“The Eurasian Century,Part V:Beijing’s Gambit，”American Enterprise Institute,December 10,2021,https：//www.aei.org/articles/the-eurasian-century-part-v-beijings-gambit/，July 6,2023.
(3)Nargis Kassenova，“How China’s Foreign Aid Fosters Social Bonds With Central Asian Ruling Elites，”Carnegie Endowment for International Peace,December 7,2022,https：//carnegieendowment.org/research/2022/12/how-chinas-foreign-aid-fosterssocial-bonds-with-central-asian-ruling-elites?lang=en,July 6,2023.
(4)Robert E. Hamilton，“China,Russia,and Power Transition in Central Asia，”Foreign Policy Research Institute,May 2024,https：//www.fpri.org/article/2024/05/china-russia-and-power-transition-in-central-asia/，July 6,2023.
(5)参见刘馨蔚：《天山雪水源远流长“千年驿站”合作无“疆”》，《中国对外贸易》2025年第10期，第62—65页。
(6)See Bruce Pannier，“Debt and Development:The Next Chapter of Chinese Investments in Central Asia，”Foreign Policy Research Institute,August 2025,https：//www.fpri.org/article/2025/08/debt-and-development-the-next-chapter-of-chinese-investmentsin-central-asia/，November 1,2025.
(7)See Ben Mauk，“The New Silk Road:China’s Campaign to Dominate the Global Economy，”Irish Examiner,February 9,2019,https：//www.irishexaminer.com/lifestyle/arid-30903212.html,July 14,2023.
(8)Temur Umarov“,What’s Behind Protests Against China in Kazakhstan?” Carnegie Endowment for International Peace,October2019,https：//carnegieendowment.org/posts/2019/10/whats-behind-protests-against-china-in-kazakhstan?lang=en,June 1,2025.
(9)Indermit Gill,Somik Lall and Mathilde Lebrand，“Winners and Losers Along China’s Belt and Road，”Brookings Institution,June 21,2019,https：//www.brookings.edu/articles/winners-and-losers-along-chinas-belt-and-road/，May 9,2025.
(1)Emily Feng，“China Extends Uighur Crackdown Beyond Its Borders，”Financial Times,August 26, 2018,https：//www.ft.com/content/179dea50-95f9-11e8-b67b-b8205561c3fe,July 9,2023.
(2)Abbos Bobokhonov，“China’s Global Security Initiative:Tilting the Balance in Central Asia，”United States Institute of Peace, August 9,2024,https：//www.usip.org/publications/2024/08/chinas-global-security-initiative-tilting-balance-central-asia,March 5,2025.
(3)See Niva Yau，“Central Asia and China’s Taiwan Dilemma，”Foreign Policy Research Institute,September 20,2022,https：//www.fpri.org/article/2022/09/central-asia-and-chinas-taiwan-dilemma/，June 2,2025.
(4)Michael Rubin，“Should the United States Support Chinese Separatism?”American Enterprise Institute, November 19,2021,https：//www.aei.org/op-eds/should-the-united-states-support-chinese-separatism/，July 2,2023.
(5)Sheena Greitens, Myunghee Lee and Emir Yazici，“Counterterrorism and Preventive Repression:China’s Changing Strategy in Xinjiang，” International Security, vol. 44, no. 3, 2020, pp. 9-47.
(6)Bates Gill and Courtney Freeman，“What Does Further Expansion Mean for the Shanghai Cooperation Organization?” United States Institute of Peace,May 2024,https：//www. usip. org/publications/2024/05/what-does-further-expansion-mean-shanghaicooperation-organization,March 3,2025.
(7)Adina Masalbekova，“How China Is Leveraging Security Cooperation in Central Asia，”United States Institute of Peace,September 9,2024,https：//www. usip. org/publications/2024/09/how-china-leveraging-security-cooperation-central-asia,March 7,2025.
(8)Niva Yau，“China’s Security Management Towards Central Asia，”Foreign Policy Research Institute,April 1,2022,https：//www.fpri.org/article/2022/04/chinas-security-management-towards-central-asia/，June 2,2025.
(1)See Will Piekos，“China’s Inroads into Central Asia，” Council on Foreign Relations,September 20, 2013, https：//www.cfr.org/blog/will-piekos-chinas-inroads-central-asia,July 2, 2023.
(2)See June Teufel Dreyer，“The Not At All Autonomous Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region:An International Human Rights Embarrassment and Pothole on China’s Belt and Road，”Foreign Policy Research Institute,March 5,2019,https：//www.fpri.org/article/2019/03/the-not-at-all-autonomous-xinjiang-uyghur-autonomous-region-an-international-human-rightsembarrassment-and-pothole-on-chinas-belt-and-road/，May 7, 2025.
(3)See Lindsay Maizland，“China’s Repression of Uyghurs in Xinjiang，”Council on Foreign Relations, October 3, 2025, https：//www.cfr.org/backgrounder/china-xinjiang-uyghurs-muslims-repression-genocide-human-rights, November 1, 2025.
(4)See Lindsay Maizland，“China’s Approach to International Terrorism，”United States Institute of Peace, October 2017,https：//www.usip.org/publications/2017/10/chinas-approach-international-terrorism, July 2, 2023.
(5)刘赛、石岚：《论美国非政府组织在中亚的活动与角色》，《俄罗斯东欧中亚研究》2022年第6期，第58页。
(6)参见岳圣淞：《图式演绎、叙事重构与冷战后美国对华价值观外交》，《世界经济与政治》2023年第4期，第44页。
(7)Tom Cotton，“Remarks by Senator Tom Cotton on the Xinjiang Emergency，”Hudson Institute,February 6, 2019, https：//www.hudson.org/human-rights/remarks-by-senator-tom-cotton-on-the-xinjiang-emergency, July 14, 2023.
(8)参见甄飞扬：《美国智库对中国参与太平洋岛国事务的负面认知：成因与对策》，《情报杂志》2023年第7期，第37页。
(1)See Tom Cotton，“Remarks by Senator Tom Cotton on the Xinjiang Emergency，”Hudson Institute, February 6,2019,https：//www.hudson.org/human-rights/remarks-by-senator-tom-cotton-on-the-xinjiang-emergency,July 14,2023.
(2)参见朱启超、龙坤：《试论后九一一时代美国国家安全战略的调整——基于对特朗普政府“美国国家安全战略”报告的分析》，《美国研究》2018年第3期，第82页。
(3)参见余虹：《共建“一带一路”助力构建开放型世界经济（国际论坛）》，2023年6月10日，https：//paper.people.com.cn/rmrbwap/html/2023-06/10/nw.D110000renmrb_20230610_2-03.htm,2023年7月10日。
(4)参见黑宏伟：《2025（中国）亚欧商品贸易博览会丨激发新活力共享新机遇》，2025年6月26日，https：//www.caeexpo.org. cn/zh/news/76cc0000-a8fe-a29f-4a94-08ddb233e459? content=%E5%B1%95%E4%BC%9A%E8%A6%81%E9%97%BB&name=news&isname=%E6%96%B0%E9%97%BB%E4%B8%AD%E5%BF%83,2025年11月24日。
(5)参见曾向红：《“无声的协调”：大国在中亚的互动模式新探》，《世界经济与政治》2022年第10期，第43页。
(1)Tom Cotton，“Remarks by Senator Tom Cotton on the Xinjiang Emergency，”Hudson Institute,February 6,2019,https：//www.hudson.org/human-rights/remarks-by-senator-tom-cotton-on-the-xinjiang-emergency,July 14,2023.
(2)Michael Rubin，“Should the United States Support Chinese Separatism?”American Enterprise Institute,November 19,2021,https：//www.aei.org/op-eds/should-the-united-states-support-chinese-separatism/，July 2,2023.
(3)参见姜昱同、冯卫国：《美国智库对“健康丝绸之路”倡议的关注重点与中国应对》，《情报杂志》2021年第3期，第65页。
(4)See James McBride，“China’s Massive Belt and Road Initiative，” Council on Foreign Relations,February 2,2023,https：//www.cfr.org/backgrounder/chinas-massive-belt-and-road-initiative, October 18, 2025.
(5)Hal Brands，“The Eurasian Century,Part V:Beijing’s Gambit，”American Enterprise Institute,December 10,2021,https：//www.aei.org/articles/the-eurasian-century-part-v-beijings-gambit/，July 8, 2025.
(6)Federal Government of the United States,National Security Strategy of the United States of America,Washington:The White House, 2025, pp. 19-24.
(1)Abbos Bobokhonov，“China’s Global Security Initiative:Tilting the Balance in Central Asia，”United States Institute of Peace,August 9,2024,https：//www. usip. org/publications/2024/08/chinas-global-security-initiative-tilting-balance-central-asia,March 5,2025.
(2)Philippe Le Corre，“Kazakhs Wary of Chinese Embrace as BRI Gathers Steam，” Carnegie Endowment for International Peace,February 28,2019,https：//carnegieendowment.org/posts/2019/02/kazakhs-wary-of-chinese-embrace-as-bri-gatherssteam?lang=en,October 17,2025.
(3)Doug Bandow，“Chinese Oppression of the Uyghurs Goes Global，”Cato Institute,June 9,2022,https：//www.cato.org/commentary/chinese-oppression-uyghurs-goes-global,October 18,2025.
(4)参见干春晖：《中国智库国际化发展策略研究》，《中国科学院院刊》2022年第7期，第990页。
(1)参见姜昱同、冯卫国：《美国智库对“健康丝绸之路”倡议的关注重点与中国应对》，《情报杂志》2021年第3期，第63页。
(2)人民日报：《携手共命运一起向未来》，2022年1月26日，http：//politics.people.com.cn/n1/2022/0126/c1024-32339771.html,2023年7月20日。
(3)中华人民共和国外交部：《王毅谈中国—中亚外长第五次会晤达成的共识》，2024年12月1日，https：//www.fmprc.gov.cn/wjbzhd/202412/t20241201_11535963.shtml,2025年3月6日。
(4)参见邓浩：《构建中国—中亚命运共同体的时代价值和实践路径》，《当代世界》2023年第6期，第16页。
(5)参见汪瑾、黄燕：《“一带一路”倡议下的新疆对中亚直接投资》，《中南民族大学学报》（人文社会科学版）2021年第6期，第82页。
基本信息:
DOI：10.13568/j.cnki.issn1000-2820.2026.02.007
中图分类号:C932;D871.2;D822
引用信息:
[1]沈霄,惠娇.美国主流智库对涉疆及中亚议题的关注重点与中国应对[J].新疆大学学报(哲学社会科学版),2026,54(02):73-84.DOI:10.13568/j.cnki.issn1000-2820.2026.02.007.
基金信息:
陕西省网络意识形态安全研究院项目“中亚五国主流媒体‘一带一路’倡议报道的传播效果研究”（WL03001）; 西安交通大学“习近平文化思想”研究阐释专项项目“‘一带一路’背景下陕西国际传播能力建设推进路径研究”（SKZX2024022）
2023-10-23
2023
2023-12-26
2025-11-10
2025
3
2026-03-15
2026-03-15